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In arecent article in The New YOrk Times Book RevieUj Christopher
Hitchens declared that "by 1980 [Louis] Althusser had been exposed
as the utter fraud he later confessed himself to be..." (5/22/05: 18).
American literary critics will find this summary judgment surprising,
accustomed as they are to the regular appearance of Althusser's
"Ideological State Apparatuses" essay in anthologies of critical theory
and cultural studies, as well as to frequent citations of Althusser's work
in discussions of aesthetics and politics, gender, and law and literature.
Althusser's stock among British leftists has notoriously always had its
ups and downs, but one could be forgiven for thinking that his place in
the contemporary canon is far from precarious. Assuming that
Hitchens's statement is evidence of something more than one
journalist's ill-informed opinion, the real issue may be why Althusser's
work has consistendy prompted widely differing evaluations among
both his supporters and his detractors. In this regard, Warren Montag's
Louis Althusser is an important new conttibution to a tortuously
polemical field. For Montag, the basic challenge in interpreting
Althusser is the problem of engagingwith a corpus thatis fundamentally
divided against itseli Althusser, Montag writes, "would appear to
embody the opposition between postmodernism and modernism,
between rationalism and irrationalism, and can be summonedin defense
of either of the opposing sides" (133). Montag quickly moves beyond
the suggestion that contradictory accounts of Althusser's positions
are the product of the subjectivevicissitudes of his interpreters, stressing
that the conflicted nature of the reuvre reflects the conflicted dynamics
it explores. The result is a spirited presentation of the unique
understanding of literature and history offered by one of the late
twentieth century's preeminent Marxists.
Published in Palgrave's Transitions series, uuisAlthusseris explicidy
designed to assist students by illustrating how theoretical arguments
can and should inform practical textual exegesis. Following what
appears to be a prescribed format, the opening chapter of the book
provides a sustained scholarly account of Althusser's aesthetics. A
shorter second chapter-a collection of annotated quotations from
Althusser (and Pierre Macherey)-is followed by a third section in
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wruch Montag undertakes Althusserian readings of Joseph Conrad's
Heart of DarknessJ Daniel Defoe's Robinson CrusoeJ and Althusser's own
autobiography, The Future Lasts Forever.
The discussion in chapter 1 addresses two familiar essays,
"Cremonini, Painter of the Abstract" and "The 'Piccolo Teatro':
Bertolazzi and Brecht (notes on a materialist theater):' as weIl as a
number of shorter pieces, including a little-known talk on drama,
published in a provincial ltalian paper in 1964 but never translated into
English, and an unfinished text called "Sur Brecht et Man." For
Althusser in the 1960s, writes Montag, "the function of art was not so
much to make reality visible as to make visible the myths that govem,
without our knowledge or consent, the way we think about and 'live'
this reality" (21). Crucially, this art is not a passive representational
medium. To the contrar)r, "great art ... carries out a displacement of
the ideology it presents to us and allows it not simply to be seen as
ideology but to be feIt or experienced as such"-an achievement,
Montag emphasizes, that may erase the distinction between art and
philosophy, wruch both come to name a similar event of insight (35).
There is nothing particu1arly extravagant about these claims for
"great" art's powers, and Montag immediately notes that in this form
Althusser's aesthetics is "quite orthodox," resting on an opposition
between genuine art, wruch begins with ideology only to "define itself
against it," and all other art, wruch is "reducible to the ideology that it
uncritically and unproblematically expresses" (37). Grasped in these
terms, argues Montag, art is deprived "of any material existence: in
[the latter] case it lapses into ideology and in the [former] it disappears
into the practice of philosophy, that practice in wruch the future of
theater lies (according to a passage from Brecht cited by Althusser)"
(38). Montag makes clear that Althusser was well aware of the risk of
elidingart's specificity in the very attempt to championit. He reevaluated
bis positions a number of times, u1timately declaring in a 1971 text that
we do notyetpossess "anadequate (scientific) knowledgeof the processes
which produce the 'aesthetic effeet' of the work of art" (41).
To characterize Althusser's further reconsiderations of these
problems, Montag turns to the openingof ReadingCapital(1975), where
Althusser famously proclaims that to engage with Marx's magnum
opus we must first ask: ''What is it to read?" Montag's presentation of
the idea of "symptomatic reading" is a bit brief: A more detailed
exposition of Althusser's account of Marx on Adam Smith might
have clarified how the "irreducibly contradictory economic theories"
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Marx locates in bis predecessor's work are evidence of a specifically
textual discord. Montag does do an excellent job of detailing the debt
Althusser owes to Spinoza and bis rethinking of biblical hermeneutics.
Spinoza calls on us to avoid tteating the Scriptures as a mere pretext
for an internal meaning they ostensibly articulate and problematizes
any simple identification between the production of a work (and the
identity of its creator) and its meaning. Instead of trying to explain
away "gaps, lacunae, inconsistencies and outright contradictions of
doctrine and narrative," Spinoza argues that we must concenttate on
the "surface" of the text in its own light and stop speculating about
the semantic "depths" supposedly lurking underneath (48).
Montag suggests that the full implications of these claims for
the study of literature were explored not by Ald1.usser but by the
aforementioned Pierre Macherey, long creditedwith having formulated
a "literary version" of Althusserian Marxism. To this end, a ten-page
section of chapter 1 is dedicated to introducing Macherey's attacks on
interpretive strategies that reduce the literarywork to a unified intention,
internal or external as it may be. While the discussion is persuasive,
one wonders why it is rarely asked whether there might be some crucial
differences between these two thinkers. Even when Montag goes out
of bis way to note how their projects diverge, he seems to be proceeding
on the basis of an assumption about a more fundamental connection
uniting them.
Given Althusser's well-known anti-humanism, the writers he
celebrates as producing "great" art are somewhat predictable. We are
accustomed to affirming the radicality of minimalist theater, abstract
expressionism, and French New Wave cinema for their critiques of
bourgeois subjectivity and the idea of a universal human essence. At
the same time, Montag righdy reminds us that many left-wing
contemporaries of Althusser dismissed the aesthetic projects of Brecht
or Samuel Beckett as "the subjectivist denial of social reality or elitist
formalism," a stance still present to some degree on the academic left
today (22). In the face of these tensions, a comparison of the Althusser-
Macherey project with the work of Theodor W Adorno would have
been interesting, not least since Adorno shared Althusser's admiration
for Beckett but differed with him starklyon Brecht's importance.
From the perspective of the theoretical positions set forth in the
first part of Uluis Al/hUSSeT; the exemplary readings of chapter 3 are
designed to show how the literary work "bears in its very form, its
letter, the struggles, the clashes, the warfare that traverse the social
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realm" (67). Montag is careful to try to distinguish trus paradigm of
textuality from a reflective model inwhich the key to interpreting novels
or poems lies in describing the ways in which they mirror the
circumstances surrounding their production. On this score, the opening
study of Heart of Darkness is not entirely successful, remaining by and
large a fairly conventional piece of criticism organized around familiar
elements of historicist and intertextual analysis. The discussion of
Robinson Crusoe is more effective in showing how one might consider
novels as "open processes transformed by the movement of history
itself" rather than as dormant monuments awaiting inspection and
classification at the hands of the discerning critic (68). Defoe's text,
writes Montag, "progresses through a dissociative movement, the force
of which pulls it apart, separating it from itselE This dissociation,
however, is not the effect of some prima! disorder or indeterminaey; it
is historically determined by the multiple and intersecting struggles of
Defoe's time..." (117). In this sense, the work of art has a dynamic
existence; it takes place as aseries of encounters between discourses
and their countervailing interpellative powers. Literary texts, according
to a logic that will be familiar to readers of "Ideological State
Apparatuses," must therefore be grasped not as products but as self-
reproducing systems, i.e., they should be understood with reference to
the way in which they insist and persist through the transmissions and
transformations Montag calls their history. At this point, I would have
liked to see the presentation of trus "dissociative movement" more
closely connected to the question of textual "gaps" and "lacunae"
addressed in the reading of Spinoza. Conceptualizing these
relationships in a more explicitly linguisticvocabularywould have helped
to distinguish Althusserian interpretation from other forms of discourse
analysis, and it might have revealed that Althusser and Macherey invite
us to think not only about "the very emergence in history of something
ca1led literature:' but also about the emergence in literature of something
called history (5).
The third exemplary reading of chapter 3, the discussion of
Althusser's autobiography, addresses the charge that Althusser's theory
of interpellation does not allow for the possibility of a ''bad'' subject
who could resist or simply ignore the halls addressed to it The iron~
argues Montag, is that in The Future LastsForeverAlthusser has essentially
taken himself as a bad subject, a subject who may not even answer his
own auto-interpellation, his own call to be the subject of a narrative
about hirnself. The result is a profound decentering of the
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autobiographical project. Rather than presenting the truth of the seIf-
for example, a self named ''Louis Althusser"-the work offers us a
conflicted dynamic with no clear uniting principle. Presciendy
anticipating the misreading of someone like Christopher Hitchens,
who takes the self-denunciation in Althusser's book as evidence that
the entire reuvre is rotten, Montag stresses that the naive crirical project
committed to the defense of the bourgeois subject is fated to judge an
autobiography rather than to read it, hence, to mistake this book's
critique of subjectivism for the breakdown of a particular individual's
authority.
Althusser described the beginning of the 1990s as "a time when
Marxism is declared dead and buried" (125). Since this time is still very
much our time, it is crucial to remember that the effort to map the
logics of contemporary culture is oolyone dimensionof the progressive
project. In abrief conclusion, Montag argues that while the object of
criticallabor is to "produce knowledge," such an endeavor is always in
part an acquisition of knowledge about the limits of knowledge, hence,
it is equally achallenge to the explanatory authority of any given
epistemological or bistol1cal paradigm (134). In working on Althusser,
then, "it is possible ... that we will contribute not only to a knowledge
of the social world, but to its transformation, which is, after all, that to
wbich Althusser devoted bis life" (135). We can only hope that




Ann Harde, Michel deMontaigne: AccidentalPhilosopher
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), viii+303
pages.
Rarely did Montaigne's resdess attention pause long enough for
reflection to wrest itself free from the immediacy of lived experience.
Where modern philosophy; with Descartes, is born out of an almost
ascetic refusal of our worldly being, the Essqys can ttace their 011ginS
back to the contingent and concrete givens of personal existence.
Montaigne is interested only in bis manners, bis moeurs, bis ways of
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